




Letting the Perfect Become the Enemy of the
Good: The Relatedness Problem in Personal
Jurisdiction
Robin Effron
Brooklyn Law School, robin.effron@brooklaw.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the Jurisdiction Commons, and the Other Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
16 Lewis & Clark Law Review 867 (2012)
Do Not Delete 7/15/2012 4:40 PM 
 
867 
LETTING THE PERFECT BECOME THE ENEMY OF THE GOOD: 
THE RELATEDNESS PROBLEM IN PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
by 
Robin J. Effron∗ 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in J. McIntyre Machinery v. 
Nicastro had the potential to resolve nearly two decades of confusion in 
personal jurisdiction doctrine. Confronted with the earlier Asahi plurality 
opinions, which had established competing “stream of commerce” theories, 
the Court produced a fractured 4–2–3 opinion that resolved little beyond 
holding that the New Jersey courts could not exercise personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant in the instant case.  
In this Article, I consider one dimension of the doctrinal deadlock that the 
Supreme Court produced in Nicastro: the concept of specific jurisdiction 
itself. In recent cases, most notably in Nicastro, the Court has become 
obsessed with the general and abstract contours of the relationship between a 
defendant and the forum state. However, one of the most important aspects 
of the distinction between general and specific jurisdiction is the relatedness 
between the lawsuit and the forum state. In conceptualizing relatedness at 
the highest level of generality, the Supreme Court has characterized the 
relatedness problem in a way that is nearly impossible to answer in any 
concrete case that comes before it. In other words, the Supreme Court has let 
the perfect become the enemy of the good. Instead of producing a flexible, 
workable, if not entirely global or perfect rule, the Court has given the lower 
courts hardly any rule at all. 
This Article suggests that in order to break the stream of commerce stalemate, 
the Supreme Court should refocus specific jurisdiction doctrine so that it 
produces concrete answers to the two dimensions of the relatedness problem. It 
further argues that Justice Brennan’s stream of commerce position from 
Asahi remains the most viable path for specific jurisdiction analysis. The 
expansive scope of the Brennan position fits well with modern 
understandings of commerce and the domestic and international sale and 
distribution of goods. Moreover, in tandem with a robust fairness analysis, 
the stream of commerce position will allow courts to examine the two 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in J. McIntyre Machinery v. 
Nicastro1 had the potential to resolve nearly two decades of confusion in 
personal jurisdiction doctrine. Confronted with the earlier Asahi2 
plurality opinions, which had established competing “stream of 
commerce” theories, the Court produced a fractured 4–2–3 opinion that 
resolved little beyond holding that the New Jersey courts could not 
exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant in the instant case. The 
academic community met the Nicastro decision with almost unanimous 
disapproval, decrying the Court’s inability to resolve the stream of 
commerce theory in particular and to articulate a coherent theory of 
personal jurisdiction in general.3 The fuzziness between general and 
specific jurisdiction, as well as the uncertainties in each of these doctrines 
 
1 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
2 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
3 See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the 
Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1245 (2011) 
(“The Supreme Court performed miserably. Its opinion in J. McIntyre . . . is a 
disaster.”); Allan Ides, Foreword: A Critical Appraisal of the Supreme Court’s Decision in J. 
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 341, 344–46, 358–62, 367–
69, 386–87 (2012) (The opinions “exacerbated rather than ameliorated the doctrinal 
confusion.”); Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts After Goodyear 
and McIntyre, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 202, 241–42 (2011) (“[T]he cases may serve to 
increase the confusion of the lower courts about the requirements for establishing 
both general and specific jurisdiction.”); Adam N. Steinman, The Lay of the Land: 
Examining the Three Opinions in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV. 
481, 515 (2012) (calling the “lack of a majority opinion” in Nicastro “disappointing”). 
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themselves can be attributed to a lack of a coherent theory underlying 
the exercise of personal jurisdiction at all.4 In this Article, I join the 
chorus of critics and suggest that we might shed new light on this debate 
by revisiting an old concept—specific jurisdiction—and that to fully 
understand the quandary of specific jurisdiction, we must look outside of 
personal jurisdiction itself. 
The critiques leveled against the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional 
jurisprudence are well-known: that the doctrine is fuzzy, malleable, and 
highly case specific, and that the Court has been either unable or 
unwilling to provide a comprehensive and coherent legal and political 
theory underlying the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendants 
in a forum state.5  This doctrinal confusion culminated in the Nicastro 
case, with Justices who could not command a majority and an opinion 
that communicates very little in the way of useful information to lower 
courts and future litigants. 
In this Article, I consider one dimension of why Nicastro has resulted 
in decision paralysis at the Supreme Court: the concept of specific 
jurisdiction itself. When Nicastro is considered alongside its companion 
case, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,6 a picture of the 
problems caused by an under-theorized doctrine of specific jurisdiction 
 
4 See, e.g., Jay Conison, What Does Due Process Have to Do with Jurisdiction?, 46 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1071, 1076 (1994) (“[Personal jurisdiction doctrine] is a body of law 
whose purpose is uncertain, whose rules and standards seem incapable of 
clarification, and whose connection to the Constitution cannot easily be divined.”); 
Friedrich K. Juenger, A Shoe Unfit for Globetrotting, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1027, 1027 
(1995) (“American jurisdictional law is a mess. . . . [The Court is unable] to devise a 
satisfactory approach to the simple question of where a civil action may be 
brought.”); Wendy Collins Perdue, Personal Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box, 32 B.C. 
L. REV. 529, 532 (1991) (“Until we finally identify the underlying problem for which 
personal jurisdiction is the solution, the doctrinal muddle will persist.”); Todd David 
Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 101 (2010) 
(“[The Supreme Court has been unable] to enunciate a coherent theory of precisely 
why the Due Process Clause imposes limitations on the states’ exercises of personal 
jurisdiction.”); Peterson, supra note 3, at 241 (“[T]he cases may serve to increase the 
confusion of the lower courts about the requirements for establishing both general 
and specific jurisdiction.”).  
5 See, e.g., Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts: Toward a 
Mixed Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J. 189, 189 (1998) (“Ambiguity and 
incoherence have plagued the minimum contacts test . . . .”); Perdue, supra note 4, at 
530 (“[E]very few years, the Court’s description of personal jurisdiction is 
inconsistent with its recent prior precedent.”); Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal 
Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849, 850 (1989) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court . . . has failed to expound a coherent theory of the limits of state 
sovereignty over noncitizens or aliens.”). See generally Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction’s 
Noble Lie, 61 STAN. L. REV. 971 (2009); Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and 
Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1112 (1981). 
6 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
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emerges. The puzzles of general and specific jurisdiction are not new,7 
but the extent to which they have wreaked havoc in recent jurisprudence 
underscores the need to resolve these difficulties in a speedy and orderly 
fashion. 
In recent cases, most notably in Nicastro, the Court has become 
obsessed with the general and abstract contours of the relationship 
between a defendant and the forum state.8 However, one of the most 
important aspects of the distinction between general and specific 
jurisdiction is an examination of the relatedness between the lawsuit and 
the forum state.9  
When viewed from the perspective of relatedness, the problem of 
specific jurisdiction is a variant of other procedural puzzles that all seek 
to answer the same question: How common is common enough? This 
question is woven through procedural doctrines involving joinder, 
aggregate litigation, amendment of pleadings, and subject matter 
jurisdiction, and is notoriously difficult to answer. In conceptualizing 
relatedness at the highest level of generality, the Supreme Court has let 
the perfect become the enemy of the good. Instead of producing a 
flexible, workable, if not entirely global or perfect rule, the Court has 
given the lower courts hardly any rule at all. 
The relatedness inquiry can and should be tied to the underlying 
purpose of the procedural device. In other words, the relatedness inquiry 
is most successful when the perfect has not become the enemy of the 
good, and the good is tied to sound procedural purposes. In earlier work, 
I have criticized the jurisprudence of relatedness and commonality in 
doctrines such as joinder.10 My claim there is that courts are overly 
focused on factual specificity and insufficiently attentive to the purpose 
that the concept of relatedness serves.11 The issue in personal jurisdiction 
presents a mirror image of that problem: with such an intense focus on 
competing theories of jurisdiction, courts and scholars have been 
inattentive to the role that factual relatedness to the lawsuit can and 
should play in the jurisdictional inquiry.  
The divide between general and specific jurisdiction, and the 
reluctance to engage with specific jurisdiction on its own terms provides 
one explanation for the startling gap between the fractured Nicastro 
decision and the unanimous and clearly reasoned opinion in Goodyear. 
The gulf between these two cases suggests that the Court is perfectly 
capable of developing theories and rules of personal jurisdiction when 
 
7 See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 1444 (1988); Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
610 (1988). 
8 See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787–89 (2011). 
9 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8–9 
(1984); Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 1994). 
10 See generally Robin J. Effron, The Shadow Rules of Joinder, 100 GEO. L.J. 759 (2012). 
11 Id. at 789. 
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one dimension of the problem of relatedness is removed from the 
picture. Assuming, then, that specific jurisdiction is founded on sound 
constitutional and conceptual grounds, the challenge for the future is to 
fashion a jurisprudence of relatedness that can function in harmony with 
the underlying theories of personal jurisdiction, rather than obscuring 
them. Moreover, when the “fuzziness” of jurisdictional doctrine is 
attributed to relatedness rather than to the underlying power of the 
sovereign itself, the Court might find itself less paralyzed by the fear of 
drawing the Due Process line in the “right” place, and instead be willing 
to deliver clear rules of personal jurisdiction that give better direction to 
litigants and lower courts. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I traces the history of 
personal jurisdiction through the lense of the relatedness problem, and 
argues that the Court has elided the two dimensions of the relatedness 
problem—the relationship between the defendant and the forum, and 
the relationship between the lawsuit and the forum—in a way that has 
made some specific jurisdiction cases nearly impossible to answer. It then 
delivers a detailed critique of the Nicastro opinion and the Court’s failure 
to articulate a majority opinion, and contrasts it with the deceptively easy 
and unanimous Goodyear opinion. 
Part II offers further reflections on how a sharper focus on the 
relationship of the lawsuit to the forum can help to move the Court 
beyond its decision paralysis. First, this Part argues some procedural 
doctrines, such as joinder and personal jurisdiction, are not successful 
when they are framed in terms generalized abstract relatedness 
questions.  It then argues that Nicastro’s failure can be attributed, at least 
in part, to this problem.  This Part then suggests that the path away from 
decision paralysis must include a commitment by the Supreme Court to 
avoid framing the personal jurisdiction problem in terms of abstract 
relatedness. 
Part III revisits the concept of nationwide contacts that are inclusive 
of a forum state and argues that it remains the best path toward a 
coherent and consistent specific jurisdiction doctrine. This Part further 
argues that adopting the “nationwide contacts” view espoused by Justice 
Ginsburg in her Nicastro dissent might be the best way forward, but that it 
is possible only when seen as a proper and limited consequence of the 
exercise of specific jurisdiction. Far from being an unwieldy and 
overbroad doctrine, nationwide contacts function appropriately in 
stream of commerce cases because they are limited by the concept of 
specific jurisdiction which ties the lawsuit specifically to the forum, rather 
than the defendant generally. Moreover, if Justice Brennan’s vision from 
Asahi is revived and invigorated, the fairness factors from World-Wide 
Volkswagen12 can guard against the excessive exercises of jurisdiction. In 
addition to putting appropriate limitations on unfair exercises of 
 
12 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 
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jurisdiction, the fairness factors can be construed so as to encourage an 
examination of the question of the defendant’s relatedness to the forum, 
thus ensuring that courts consider both aspects of relatedness in a 
concrete manner. 
I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND DECISION PARALYSIS 
In this Part, I argue that the Supreme Court has reached a point of 
decision paralysis in personal jurisdiction doctrine and that this paralysis 
will continue so long as the Court searches for a definitive answer to the 
relatedness problem. I do not mean to suggest that the relatedness 
problem is the only source of trouble plaguing personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence. Plenty of ideological and theoretical hurdles stand 
between the doctrine as it currently stands and a coherent articulation of 
personal jurisdiction standards. A closer look at the relatedness problem, 
however, will move the debate forward in a healthy way. 
A. The Relatedness Problem and the Path to the Stream of Commerce Crisis 
The relatedness problem in personal jurisdiction has two 
dimensions. First, there is the problem of the relationship between the 
defendant and the forum state. Second, there is the problem of the 
relationship between the lawsuit and the forum state. Although these two 
problems are interconnected, they form distinct analytical categories. 
Unfortunately, many judges and commentators do not treat them as 
such. Instead, relatedness is an open and fluid category in which judges 
slip back and forth between comments about the relationship between a 
defendant and the forum and comments about the relationship between 
the lawsuit and the forum. Treating the relatedness problem as a broad 
and vague category is not a successful strategy for procedural questions.13  
The Nicastro and Goodyear opinions are the latest chapter in the 
development of personal jurisdiction doctrine. Detailed and thorough 
histories of personal jurisdiction abound;14 thus, my aim here is to situate 
the reader in the context of the latest jurisprudence. 
1. Specific Jurisdiction and the Divergence of Categories of Relatedness 
The journey to decision paralysis began in 1945 with International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, in which the Supreme Court announced that an 
out of state corporation could be subject to personal jurisdiction in the 
 
13 See infra Part II.A (discussing the relatedness problem in joinder). 
14 See, e.g., Richard D. Freer, Personal Jurisdiction in the Twenty-First Century: The 
Ironic Influence of Justice Brennan, 63 S.C. L. REV. 551 (2012); Sean K. Hornbeck, 
Comment, Transnational Litigation and Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Defendants, 59 
ALB. L. REV. 1389 (1996); Perdue, supra note 4; William M. Richman, Understanding 
Personal Jurisdiction, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599 (1993); Flavio Rose, Related Contacts and 
Personal Jurisdiction: The “But For” Test, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1545, 1546–52 (1994); A. 
Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 617, 
620–25 (2006). 
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forum state if it had “certain minimum contacts with it such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice.’”15 
International Shoe contained the seeds of both general and specific 
jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction involves jurisdiction over parties whose 
contact with the forum state is related to the lawsuit.16 General 
jurisdiction, on the other hand, is “dispute-blind” meaning that a court of 
a forum state may exercise jurisdiction over any claim against a party 
regardless of the relationship of the party’s contacts with the forum state 
and the lawsuit at hand.17 The Court in International Shoe did not specify 
whether the facts of that case supported general or specific jurisdiction, 
suggesting at some points that Washington State could exercise 
jurisdiction over the company because of its “systematic and continuous” 
activities in the state, but at other times that jurisdiction was fair because 
the lawsuit itself “arose out of those very activities.”18 
The ambiguity between general and specific jurisdiction in 
International Shoe was understandable. The “general” and “specific” 
terminology itself did not even come into usage until 1966 when 
Professors von Mehren and Trautman coined the terms in a law review 
article.19 International Shoe contained enough of a revolution, dispensing 
as it did with the fiction of physical presence in the forum state,20 and 
kicking off the modern constitutional requirement of minimum contacts 
for long-arm jurisdiction.21 It would thus be unfair to accuse the Court of 
decision paralysis this early in the modern era of personal jurisdiction. 
The Supreme Court cases in the decades following International Shoe 
produced the now-familiar vocabulary of minimum contacts, an arsenal 
 
15 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
16 See id. at 317–19; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 
(1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 & nn.8–9 
(1984). 
17 Twitchell, supra note 7, at 613. 
18 Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 320. 
19 Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A 
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136–37 (1966). 
20 Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316–17 (“[T]he terms ‘present’ or ‘presence’ are used 
merely to symbolize those activities . . . which courts will deem to be sufficient to 
satisfy the demands of due process.”); see also Eric C. Hawkins, Note, General 
Jurisdiction and Internet Contacts: What Role, if Any, Should the Zippo Sliding Scale  
Test Play in the Analysis?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV 2371, 2373 n.15 (2006) (“The Court  
moved away from the legal fiction of the ‘presence’ requirement, reasoning that a 
measurement of the defendant’s activities in the forum could take its place.”); 
Douglas D. McFarland, Drop the Shoe: A Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 68 MO. L. REV 753, 
762–63 (2003) (“[A]fter rejecting the old ‘presence’ test . . . the Court . . . create[d] a 
brand-new test for a major area of the law . . . .”); Peterson, supra note 4, at 107 (“In 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, the Supreme Court established a much more 
flexible standard for analyzing personal jurisdiction, but one that was still linked to 
the Due Process Clause.” (footnote omitted)). 
21 See Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316. 
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of words including “purposeful availment,”22 “targeting” the forum state,23 
“foreseeability,”24 and a fairness vocabulary of burdens and benefits.25 
Although the constitutional underpinnings of personal jurisdiction lie in 
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the 
Court produced an ever-shifting definition of this right, stating 
sometimes that it is grounded in “interstate federalism”26 and at others 
that it is “a matter of individual liberty.”27 
During these years, the specter of relatedness haunted personal 
jurisdiction jurisprudence.28 Although the Court did not adopt the von 
Mehren and Trautman terminology until the 1980s,29 the premise of 
specific jurisdiction grounded much of the Court’s jurisprudence.30 This 
proved relatively unproblematic when there was a tight one-to-one 
connection between the relationship of the defendant to the forum and 
the relationship of the lawsuit to the forum. In International Shoe itself, for 
example, the defendant’s contacts with Washington State (selling shoes 
via independent salesman) were intimately connected with the lawsuit 
(whether the state could recover unpaid contributions to an 
unemployment fund for the activities of those salesmen).31 Likewise, the 
defendant in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. had a single contact 
with the State of California, sending an insurance contract to a California 
resident, and it was upon that contract that the lawsuit was based.32 
 
22 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
23 Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003); Toys 
“R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 452 (3d Cir. 2003). 
24 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474, 476 (1985); World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295, 297 (1980). 
25 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 117 (1987) 
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and conurring in the judgment); Burger King Corp., 
471 U.S. at 476; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292; see also Linda S. 
Mullenix, Another Easy Case, Some More Bad Law: Carnival Cruise Lines and Contractual 
Personal Jurisdiction, 27 TEX. INT’L L.J. 323, 368 (1992) (“[T]he Court gradually and 
fatefully slid into the now well-known concepts and vocabulary [of personal 
jurisdiction].”). 
26 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 294. 
27 Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 
(1982); see also Borchers, supra note 3, at 1246–47; Richman, supra note 14, at 606–07. 
But see Robert C. Casad, Personal Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases, 70 TEX. L. REV. 
1589, 1591 (1992) (noting the different constitutional sources of personal 
jurisdiction limitations); Allan R. Stein, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Seeing Due 
Process Through the Lens of Regulatory Precision, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 411, 415 (2004) 
(defending Ins. Corp. of Ireland as consistent with interstate federalism concerns); 
Trangsrud, supra note 5, at 896–98. 
28 See Spencer, supra note 14, at 618 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s personal 
jurisdiction jurisprudence has done “more to confuse and complicate the doctrine 
than Professors von Mehren and Trautman had done to clarify it”). 
29 See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8–9 (1984). 
30 Id. at 414. 
31 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
32 McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). 
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Therefore, in cases like McGee and International Shoe there was little need 
to discuss the type of relatedness grounding jurisdiction because there 
was no obvious divergence between the relatedness of the defendant to 
the forum and the relatedness of the lawsuit to the forum. 
The concept began to unravel, however, in cases where the two 
relatedness dimensions did not correspond as neatly.33 In World-Wide 
Volkswagen, for example, the relationship between the lawsuit and the 
forum was fairly high, while the relationship between two of the 
defendants and the forum was very low. The plaintiffs had sued the car 
manufacturer, distributors, and dealership in Oklahoma where the 
devastating accident had taken place.34 Two defendants challenged 
personal jurisdiction: the dealer, which was incorporated and located in 
New York, and the regional distributor, which was located in New York 
and sold cars and associated parts to retail dealers in New York, 
Connecticut, and New Jersey. Neither defendant had contacts with the 
forum state beyond any vehicles sold in the tri-state area and brought to 
Oklahoma by other individuals.35  
In its opinion, the World-Wide Volkswagen Court chose the 
relationship between the defendant and the forum as the dominant lens 
through which to view the jurisdictional problem.36 The relationship 
between the lawsuit and the forum, however, makes a few guest 
appearances in the opinion, turning up as an interest that the plaintiff 
might have in choosing her forum or the forum state might have in 
exercising jurisdiction over particular incidents.37 
It is no wonder that courts and commentators parsing the decision 
had trouble pinning down its precise meaning. Surely the relationship 
between the lawsuit and the forum must be of some relevance. Otherwise 
the Court could have dispensed with the specific jurisdiction analysis 
entirely and conducted a straightforward general jurisdiction analysis of 
World-Wide Volkswagen’s and Seaway’s connection to Oklahoma with no 
reference to the auto accident in question. However, having assumed 
that the relationship between the lawsuit and the forum state was of some 
unspecified relevance to the jurisdictional inquiry, the opinion appears 
 
33 See Bloom, supra note 5, at 985 (“[T]his prescribed approach has grown 
elaborate, even convoluted in parts. Its ‘general’ and ‘specific’ options are saddled 
with multiple layers, overlapping features, and ‘accumulat[ed]’ supplements.” 
(alteration in original) (quoting McMunigal, supra note 5, at 195)). 
34 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288 (1980). 
35 Id. at 288–89. 
36 Id. at 295. 
37 There is a rich academic debate regarding the scope of this interest, 
questioning whether the state’s interest is an ex ante regulatory interest in certain 
types of activity, or a more specific ex post interest in resolving disputes with strong ties 
to the forum. See Stein, supra note 27, at 420–29; Brilmayer, supra note 7, at 1449; see 
also Stein, supra note 27, at 434 (describing a “regulatory precision” theory that would 
“consider the impact of [a court’s] assertion of jurisdiction on the allocation of 
authority nationally and internationally”).  
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to leave open the possibility that the defendants might have been subject 
to jurisdiction in some other foreign forum, albeit one closer to their 
homes in New York, perhaps in the other two “tri-state” region states of 
Connecticut and New Jersey, or a bordering state such as Pennsylvania. 
In other words, by blending the two problems of relatedness, the Court 
teed up the stream of commerce problems in the most problematic of 
relatedness terms: How close is close enough? 
2. General Jurisdiction and the Uneasy Absence of a Lawsuit-Relatedness 
Paradigm 
Meanwhile, the Court’s consideration of general jurisdiction cases 
did little to advance the analytical ball. The Court has entertained far 
more specific jurisdiction cases than general jurisdiction cases,38 and the 
line between the two concepts looks especially blurry in light of the fact 
that the Supreme Court heard very few “true” general jurisdiction cases 
prior to Goodyear.39 In 1984, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in 
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall (Helicol).40 This case was a 
curious choice as a vehicle for general jurisdiction analysis because many 
of the defendant Helicol’s contacts with the forum state of Texas were 
connected to the contract for the sale of helicopters that ultimately 
resulted in an accident in Peru, but the Court refrained from discussing 
the meaning of any potential relatedness.41 The Court lurched forward 
with its conclusion that Helicol did not conduct the sort of systematic and 
continuous activity necessary for general jurisdiction,42 but the awkward 
fact of the relatedness of the defendant’s contacts with the lawsuit 
clouded the clarity and utility of the opinion.43 In the same year the 
Court decided Helicol, Professor Richman described specific and general 
jurisdiction as a sliding scale in which, “[a]s the quantity and quality of 
 
38 See Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 119, 129 (“[T]he Supreme Court has decided more specific [than general] 
jurisdiction cases in recent years.”). 
39 See id. at 123–26 (recounting the rare instances of “true” general jurisdiction 
cases and noting that “[the Supreme Court’s general jurisdiction cases each had] 
special circumstances that limit the explanatory value of the majority opinion”); see 
also Twitchell, supra note 7, at 635. This was also true of lower court cases. See Rose, 
supra note 14, at 1557–58. 
40 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
41 The Texas Supreme Court limited its inquiry to interpretation of the State’s 
long-arm general jurisdiction statute. Thus, the Supreme Court considered only the 
general jurisdiction basis for jurisdiction. Id. at 413 n.7. 
42 Id. at 415–16. 
43 See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The Predictability Principle in Personal Jurisdiction 
Doctrine: A Case Study on the Effects of a “Generally” Too Broad, but “Specifically” Too Narrow 
Approach to Minimum Contacts, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 135, 149–54 (2005) (discussing 
Helicol and the dispute-blind nature of general jurisdiction); see also Stein, supra note 
27, at 440 (discussing similar problems with lower court opinions and noting that 
“additional connections between the claim and the forum . . . might have rendered 
jurisdiction appropriate under a specific jurisdiction framework, and the courts 
would have been well advised to limit their holdings to those circumstances”). 
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the defendant’s forum contacts increase, a weaker connection between 
the plaintiff’s claim and those contacts is permissible; as the quantity and 
quality of the defendant’s forum contacts decrease, a stronger 
connection between the plaintiff’s claim and those contacts is 
required.”44 However, the lack of direct engagement with the relationship 
between the claim and the contacts resulted in the clumsy formalism of 
Helicol and jurisprudentially unsatisfying World-Wide Volkswagen. 
Professor Twitchell told a different story of Helicol, identifying a 
doctrine of “conditional general jurisdiction.”45 According to Twitchell, 
courts supposedly deciding cases under a general jurisdiction framework 
had actually been considering the relatedness of the contacts to the 
lawsuit.46 The Helicol case, Twitchell argued, set firmer limits on the 
exercise of general jurisdiction, particularly in cases where the contacts 
do appear to have some relationship to the cause of action.47 Thus, “[b]y 
clarifying the limits of general jurisdiction, the Court has signaled to the 
lower courts that they cannot continue to use general jurisdiction 
concepts to shield what are essentially claim-related evaluations.”48 
However, if tightening the limits of general jurisdiction was supposed to 
shift attention to the difficult and unresolved foundations and limits of 
specific jurisdiction, one wonders what went wrong in the years following 
Helicol, one wonders about the utility of the sliding scale in a world in 
which courts only sometimes give serious and separate consideration to 
the relationship between the forum contacts and the lawsuit. In other 
words, “general jurisdiction’s problems are at least partly about specific 
jurisdiction; sensible and predictable bases of general jurisdiction should 
cause no difficulty.”49 
While general jurisdiction theoretically should have focused courts’ 
attention entirely on the relationship of the defendant to the forum with 
no mention of the relationship of the lawsuit to the forum, it did not do 
so.  Instead, the muddled relatedness analysis in general jurisdiction was 
emblematic of the overall neglect of the nuances of relatedness 
categories in personal jurisdiction. 
3. The Relatedness Problem Produces the Stream of Commerce Crisis 
Given these doctrinal and theoretical difficulties, it came as little 
surprise that by the late 1980s the Court was “having difficulty generating 
majority opinions.”50 The stream of commerce cases were a lightning rod 
 
44 William M. Richman, Review Essay, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1328, 1345 (1984) 
(reviewing ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS (1983)). 
45 Twitchell, supra note 7, at 650–52. 
46 Id. at 635. 
47 Id. at 651–52. 
48 Id. at 652. 
49 Borchers, supra note 38, at 119. 
50 Perdue, supra note 4, at 530; see also Stein, supra note 27, at 433 (“The courts 
have been struggling for years outside the Internet context to refine the meaning of 
purposeful availment.”). 
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for the problems of personal jurisdiction. Placing an item in the stream 
that is eventually used or sold in the forum state is undoubtedly a contact 
with the forum, but a question remained over whether that contact meets  
the constitutional threshold of a minimum contact. These troubles 
culminated in the 1987 Asahi decision.51 The plaintiff in Asahi was injured 
in a motorcycle accident in California and alleged that the accident was 
caused by a defect in the rear tire. He sued Cheng Shin, the Taiwanese 
tire manufacturer. Cheng Shin then impleaded Asahi, a Japanese 
corporation that manufactured a valve used in the tire. The plaintiff 
settled his suit with Cheng Shin, so that only Cheng Shin’s lawsuit against 
Asahi remained, and Asahi challenged the California court’s 
jurisdiction.52 
The Supreme Court held 9–0 that California lacked personal 
jurisdiction over Asahi. But, as any first-year law student knows, looks are 
deceiving, and the Court did not deliver a majority opinion as to the 
reasoning behind the judgment. The two major plurality opinions, each 
garnering four votes, set the terms of the argument as a debate between 
the “stream of commerce” and “stream of commerce plus” doctrines.53 
Under Justice Brennan’s stream of commerce doctrine, a defendant 
manufacturer has minimum contacts with the forum state if its products 
reach the forum state through a “chain of distribution”54 and the “regular 
and anticipated flow of products from manufacture to distribution to 
retail sale.”55 Asahi represented a special case in which jurisdiction would 
be contrary to “fair play and substantial justice” because the burden on 
Asahi was particularly high and the interests of the original plaintiff and 
the forum state were unusually low.56 
Justice O’Connor, on the other hand, introduced the “stream of 
commerce plus” doctrine. Simply placing manufactured items that might 
foreseeably reach the forum state in the stream of commerce does not a 
minimum contact make. A defendant must target or “purposefully 
direct” its conduct toward the forum state.57 Despite “Asahi’s awareness 
that some of the valves sold to Cheng Shin would be incorporated into 
tire tubes [in motorcycles] sold in California,” Asahi had not 
“purposefully avail[ed] itself of the California market,” and therefore did 
not have minimum contacts with the state.58 
 
51 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court., 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
52 Id. at 105–07. 
53 Id. at 112 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (stream of commerce plus); id. at 
117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (stream of 
commerce). A third position, Justice Stevens’ volume–value theory, was difficult to 
discern and never gained much traction in the lower courts. See id. at 121–22 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
54 Id. at 120 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
55 Id. at 117. 
56 Id. at 116. 
57 Id. at 112 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
58 Id. 
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Post-Asahi, the lower courts did their best to sort out the doctrine.59 
Not only did courts need to choose between the two competing 
doctrines,60 but the contours of the doctrines themselves required more 
definition. Further complicating matters, these problems and splits 
increased with the development of the Internet, which provided new 
iterations of older problems.61 Disagreements arose as to whether the 
stream of commerce or the stream of commerce plus doctrines applied 
to fully manufactured goods or component parts;62 what role sales 
through a distributor should play;63 whether the product sold was 
considered “hazardous,”64 or what should happen if a plaintiff buys a 
product in one forum and then is injured in another forum in which the 
product is also sold.65 Courts and commentators also questioned whether 
 
59 See Peterson, supra note 3, at 207–10 (providing a history of the stream of 
commerce doctrines). 
60 Compare Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Still N the Water Publ’g, 327 F.3d 472, 479–
80 (6th Cir. 2003) (adopting the O’Connor stream of commerce plus test), with 
Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks, 963 F.2d 941, 947 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding the Brennan 
stream of commerce test is “determinative”). 
61 See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 38, at 128 (“With the rise of e-commerce to multi-
billion dollar proportions, and as interstate and international transactions over the 
Internet become increasingly common and nearly frictionless, the radical 
indeterminacy of American jurisdictional principles is a major problem.” (footnote 
omitted)); Martin H. Redish, Of New Wine and Old Bottles: Personal Jurisdiction, the 
Internet, and the Nature of Constitutional Evolution, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 575, 586–600 
(1998) (“Whether one can find consistency in the lower court’s treatment of 
jurisdiction and the Internet is debatable.”); A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction and the 
Internet: Returning to Traditional Principles to Analyze Network-Mediated Contacts, 2006 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 71, 73 (“The advent and extensive use of the Internet have presented new 
challenges for the law of personal jurisdiction.”). But see Stein, supra note 27, at 411 
(“My position is that the Internet does not pose unique jurisdictional challenges.”). 
62 Compare Hoffpauir v. Linde Lift Truck Corp., No. 03-CV-1279, 2007 WL 
963187, at *3 (W.D. La. Mar. 28, 2007) (applying stream of commerce doctrine to 
nonresident component manufacturers), and Pegasus Helicopters, Inc. v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 954 F. Supp. 218, 220 (D. Colo. 1997) (same), with Stanton v. St. Jude 
Med., Inc., 340 F.3d 690, 694 (8th Cir. 2003) (requiring purposeful availment for 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident component manufacturer). 
63 See Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610, 615 (8th 
Cir. 1994) (sale of products through a distributor does not prevent finding of specific 
jurisdiction); Tobin v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 544 (6th Cir. 1993) 
(use of a national distributor with other evidence of purposeful availment sufficient 
for specific jurisdiction); DeMoss v. City Mkt., Inc., 762 F. Supp. 913, 919 (D. Utah 
1991) (some evidence of purposeful availment, is necessary, “but it need not be 
direct”); see also Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the Personal Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 531, 554–55 (1995) (describing the pre- and post-Asahi “parade of 
horribles” in which manufacturers can insulate themselves from liability behind 
“layers of independent distributors”). 
64 See Morris v. SSE, Inc., 843 F.2d 489, 494 (11th Cir. 1988). 
65 Parry v. Ernst Home Ctr. Corp., 779 P.2d 659, 660–61 (Utah 1989). 
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either of the stream of commerce doctrines should apply to both specific 
and general jurisdiction cases.66 
Asahi thus failed to give much guidance for how to answer the 
question, How close is close enough? At one level, the disagreement 
among the justices reflects a disagreement over the permissible scope of 
attenuation. For Justice Brennan, placing an item in the stream of 
commerce that will foreseeably end up in the forum state is sufficiently 
related for purposes of personal jurisdiction,  whereas Justice O’Connor 
(and, to a certain extent, Justice Stevens67) were looking for a closer 
relationship. From this vantage point, the stream of commerce argument 
is a disagreement about degree. Those looking for an answer to the 
question, How related is related enough? in Asahi might believe that the 
answer is to be found somewhere on a continuum of relatedness between 
the Brennan and O’Connor’s positions. 
On a deeper level, however, Asahi underscores a larger conflict about 
the dimensions of the relatedness problem. Justice O’Connor’s “stream 
of commerce plus” doctrine calls for a generalized relatedness inquiry, in 
which the various aspects of the defendants relationship to the forum 
and the lawsuit’s relationship to the forum are amalgamated so that at a 
certain point they cross the threshold from too attenuated to sufficiently 
related. Justice Brennan’s stream of commerce theory, on the other 
hand, sets out a framework in which different aspects of the relatedness 
inquiry can be disaggregated. Assuming that the forum state is the place 
of injury, the foreseeability prong of the Brennan doctrine provides a 
clear answer to the question of how closely related the lawsuit must be to 
the forum state. However, the fairness prong of Brennan’s personal 
jurisdiction doctrine recognizes that the second relatedness dimension of 
the connection between the defendant and the forum state can be 
addressed separately, as a part of the fairness analysis. 
Even on this understanding, none of the Justices explicitly identified 
the two dimensions of relatedness of playing distinct and complementary 
roles, particularly in specific jurisdiction analysis. Instead, the lack of 
agreement exacerbated the need to resolve the stream of commerce 
problem itself, and the problem of personal jurisdiction increasingly 
became a problem of relatedness. 
B. The Stream of Commerce Comes to the 21st Century: Nicastro and Goodyear 
After nearly two decades of silence from the Supreme Court, the 
legal community awaited the Nicastro68 and Goodyear69 decisions with 
 
66 See Peterson, supra note 3, at 213 n.73 (citing general jurisdiction cases based 
on direct sales into the forum state). 
67 Justice Stevens wrote an opaque concurrence in Asahi promulgating a 
“volume–value” theory of personal jurisdiction. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior 
Court., 480 U.S. 102, 121 (1987). 
68 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
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baited breath, hoping for a more definitive resolution to the stream of 
commerce problem. The collective disappointment in the Court’s 
opinions in these cases was immediately palpable.70 
Nicastro and Goodyear were both products liability cases where the 
respective state courts premised personal jurisdiction on stream of 
commerce theories. The plaintiff in Nicastro, a New Jersey metal worker 
named Robert Nicastro, severely injured his hand while operating one of 
J. McIntyre Machinery’s metal-shearing machines. He sued J. McIntyre in 
New Jersey state court.71 The plaintiffs in Goodyear, the general 
jurisdiction case, were the families of two North Carolina teenagers who 
were killed in a bus accident in France who alleged that tire defects had 
caused the accident. They sued Goodyear North America, as well as three 
Goodyear manufacturing and distributing subsidiaries from Turkey, 
France, and Luxembourg in North Carolina state court.72 In both  
cases, the state courts upheld personal jurisdiction over the foreign 
defendants.73 
By the time the Supreme Court was through with these cases, it had 
produced a unanimous decision in Goodyear and a fractured, 4–2–3 
decision in Nicastro.74 The Court’s twenty-year collision course with the 
relatedness problem produced the decision paralysis in Nicastro and a 
deceptively easy solution in Goodyear. I do not mean to discount the role 
that numerous other doctrines and theories have played in perpetuating 
the personal jurisdiction crisis, and thus do not offer relatedness as a 
unifying theory and its resolution as a universal panacea. I do hope, 
however, to revive a discussion of relatedness and the special roles that 
the concepts of general and specific jurisdiction play. 
1. J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro 
J. McIntyre Machinery was incorporated in England, and its factory, 
also located in England, produced industrial-grade machinery for use in 
the metal recycling industry.75 J. McIntyre did not make direct sales of its 
goods to consumers or end-users in the United States. Instead, like many 
foreign manufacturers, J. McIntyre engaged an independent distributor 
to sell its wares throughout the country. The distributor was based in 
Ohio and marketed and sold the machines throughout the United States. 
 
69 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
70 See supra note 3. 
71 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2786. 
72 Goodyear Dunlop, 131 S. Ct. at 2850. 
73 Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 594 (N.J. 2010); Brown v. 
Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 395 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009), rev. denied, 695 S.E.2d 756 (N.C. 
2010). 
74 Goodyear Dunlop, 131 S. Ct. at 2850; Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., 
plurality opinion) (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas); 
id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (joined by Justice Alito); id. at 
2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan). 
75 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2786. 
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As many as four machines were sold to customers in New Jersey, 
including the offending metal shearer that injured the plaintiff.76 The 
manufacturer directed sales and marketing efforts for the U.S. through 
its distributor and attended trade shows in U.S. locations outside of New 
Jersey. However, it did not make any direct sales in New Jersey, nor did it 
have an office there.77 For six justices, these facts were enough to 
conclude that New Jersey could not exercise personal jurisdiction over 
the manufacturer.78 
The splintered opinion demonstrates the Supreme Court’s 
continued decision paralysis on the stream of commerce issue. One of 
the only clear things about the Nicastro opinion is that the Justices could 
not agree upon any number of the theoretical underpinnings of personal 
jurisdiction. Rather than coalesce around one or more legal or 
philosophical principles, the Justices displayed very different visions of 
what personal jurisdiction analysis should be. The plurality and 
concurring opinions are divided in their approaches to the case at hand 
and in their approaches to personal jurisdiction generally. They are, 
however, united by a failure to consider seriously the problem of 
relatedness in personal jurisdiction. Justice Breyer appears to be waiting 
for an answer to a question where the answer does not exist, and Justice 
Kennedy has wished the question itself away.79 For both, the perfect has 
become the enemy of the good. 
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion, itself no model of clarity, 
accomplished two things. First, it revived the principle of forum 
sovereignty as central to the exercise of personal jurisdiction.80 Declaring 
that “personal jurisdiction requires a . . . sovereign-by-sovereign . . . 
analysis,”81 Justice Kennedy stressed time and time again that contacts 
with the United States as a whole were entirely different from contacts 
with New Jersey. So long as the defendant was targeting the American 
market generally, it had not targeted New Jersey.82 He even carefully 
reserved the question of whether it would be constitutional for Congress, 
if it so chose, to designate the United States as a forum for personal 
 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 2786, 2790. 
78 Id. at 2785, 2791. 
79 See id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I think it unwise to 
announce a rule of broad applicability without full consideration of the modern-day 
consequences.”); id. at 2790 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion) (“The defendant’s 
conduct . . . will differ across cases and judicial exposition will, in common-law 
fashion, clarify the contours of that principle.”). 
80 Sovereignty theories embrace the adjudicatory and law-making power of the 
forum as the primary basis for jurisdictional authority. See Spencer, supra note 14, at 
640, 647. But see Redish, supra note 5 (critiquing sovereignty theories).  
81 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2789. 
82 Id. at 2790 (“These facts may reveal an intent to serve the U.S. market, but they 
do not show that J. McIntyre purposefully availed itself of the New Jersey market.”). 
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jurisdiction purposes for cases pending in federal courts.83 Second, the 
Kennedy plurality firmly rejected the Brennan stream of commerce 
position, stating that it “is inconsistent with the premises of lawful judicial 
power”84 and that “the stream-of-commerce metaphor cannot supersede 
either the mandate of the Due Process Clause or the limits on judicial 
authority that Clause ensures.”85 
Justice Breyer’s opinion, joined by Justice Alito, is decision paralysis 
writ large. Underneath his equivocation about jurisdictional theories and 
his quibbles about the suitability of Nicastro as a vehicle for announcing 
personal jurisdiction doctrine, one finds a deep discomfort with the 
concept of specific jurisdiction. An examination of Breyer’s opinion 
reveals that he is so concerned with the potential future problems posed 
by a generalized relatedness inquiry—an inquiry that curiously overlooks 
the facts of the present litigation—that he ignores the role that specific 
jurisdiction can play in grounding the relatedness problem and breaking 
it into smaller, more easily answerable questions. 
Although Justice Breyer concurs in the judgment, he is unwilling to 
sign on to the strict formalism of the Kennedy position because he 
“do[es] not agree with the plurality’s seemingly strict no-jurisdiction 
rule.”86 He is equally unwilling to join the dissenters in either 
wholeheartedly adopting the Brennan stream of commerce position, or 
in explicitly endorsing the nationwide contacts theory, under which the 
defendant “‘purposefully availed itself’ of the United States market 
nationwide,” and “thereby availed itself of the market of all States in 
which its products were sold by its exclusive distributor.”87  
Justice Breyer’s claim is that the Nicastro case fits so obviously within 
previous precedent that the case can be disposed of on its facts. Breyer 
seems to be consumed with regret that Nicastro was not an Internet or e-
commerce case and begins his opinion with a pout:  
I do not doubt that there have been many recent changes in 
commerce and communication, many of which are not anticipated 
by our precedents. But this case does not present any of those 
issues. So I think it unwise to announce a rule of broad applicability 
without full consideration of the modern-day consequences.88  
 
83 Id. Compare Maryellen Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Personal 
Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1984) (arguing that “a 
nationwide personal jurisdiction statute providing that a defendant located in or 
having minimum contacts with the United States can be sued on a federal question in 
any federal court in the country would be unconstitutional” (footnotes omitted)), with 
Casad, supra note 27, at 1599–1606 (arguing that “nationwide personal jurisdiction in 
federal question cases should be provided by Congress” and is constitutional). 
84 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2789. 
85 Id. at 2791. 
86 Id. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
87 Id. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
88 Id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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Of course, having announced his reluctance to engage with the case at 
hand, Breyer goes on to deliver a vague and ambiguous analysis of the 
situation. 
The refusal to engage broadly with the facts of Nicastro is, at one 
level, baffling. Although the Nicastro facts do not contain the fancy and 
new-fangled trappings of the Internet, they present a solid, ongoing, and 
unresolved problem: When may a forum exercise jurisdiction over a 
manufacturer who sells goods that injure someone in a forum state? That 
goods are sold to end-users in a forum state by distributors or as 
components of larger products is not a startling or a new fact. It was true 
of the world in 1945, truer of the world in 1987, and will continue to be 
true of the world in 2012 and beyond. Wishing that the case involved the 
“realities” of modern communications does not change the need to 
resolve an issue affecting how most products wind up in our homes and 
in our workplaces. If the Court cannot generate a majority opinion with 
the relatively cut-and-dry facts of the Nicastro case, it is rather difficult to 
believe that it will be able to do so in other cases in the future.  
Breyer’s desire to postpone jurisdictional decisions for an Internet 
case also indicates a somewhat naive assumption that a case involving 
“modern communications realities” will implicate a stream of commerce 
situation like Nicastro at all. Internet cases will come in all shapes and 
sizes—as questions whether a “virtual store” subjects certain businesses to 
general jurisdiction89 or specific jurisdiction,90 whether certain types of 
blogging, commenting, or posting defamatory statements on the Internet 
will subject a defendant to jurisdiction under the Calder effects test,91 or 
how sales through e-commerce intermediaries might affect a distribution 
scenario like the one in Nicastro itself. While the Internet and e-
commerce present new challenges, it is unlikely that the Court will need 
entirely new jurisdictional tools to accommodate these facts.92 Ignoring 
these nuances allows Breyer to fantasize about a future of clearer 
principles without grappling with present doctrinal challenges. 
Beyond Breyer’s misplaced concerns about Nicastro’s suitability as a 
vehicle for announcing personal jurisdiction rules, the opinion 
 
89 Compare Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 
2003) (finding general jurisdiction over L.L. Bean which operated a “virtual store” in 
the forum state via its website), with Caiazzo v. Am. Royal Arts Corp., 73 So. 3d 245, 
258–59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that there was no general jurisdiction over 
business based solely on website activity). 
90 See Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 451–54 (3d Cir. 2003).  
91 See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); see also Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 
527, 534–36 (Minn. 2002) (applying a narrow version of the Calder effects test); Novak 
v. Benn, 896 So. 2d 513, 517–20 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004) (discussing Griffis with approval). 
92 See Stein, supra note 27, at 411–12 (suggesting that the Internet itself does not 
pose new problems, but only highlights “some fundamental mistakes that both courts 
and commentators have made in conceptualizing the nature of due process 
constraints on jurisdiction”). But cf. Redish, supra note 61, at 605–06 (suggesting “an 
Internet exception to the purposeful availment requirement”). 
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demonstrates more generally that he has turned the stream of commerce 
problem into a question that cannot be satisfactorily answered. Consider 
how Breyer construes the opposing positions of the Kennedy plurality 
and the New Jersey Supreme Court (and, by extension, the Ginsburg 
dissent). According to Justice Breyer, Justice Kennedy offers “strict rules 
that limit jurisdiction” while the New Jersey Supreme Court’s rule is an 
“absolute approach” and an “automatic . . . rule” that “would permit 
every State to assert jurisdiction in a products-liability suit against  
any domestic manufacturer . . . no matter how large or small the 
manufacturer, no matter how distant the forum, and no matter how few 
the number of items that end up in the particular forum at issue.”93 
Having cast the two positions as polar opposites, Breyer sets about 
showing why he believes the dissenter’s rule is unworkable. Noting that 
“manufacturers come in many shapes and sizes,” he frets about the fate 
of the humble Appalachian potter or the small Egyptian shirt maker.94 By 
implication, he acknowledges that larger manufacturers might have 
produced, sold, marketed, or otherwise “done” enough to be subjected 
to personal jurisdiction in a forum state. Aside from these broad 
generalizations, Breyer has done little beyond turning back the clock to 
precisely where it was after World-Wide Volkswagen, leaving lower courts 
and lawyers with little clue as to how close to a forum state is close 
enough. It is easy enough to rally sympathies for a small Brazilian 
manufacturing cooperative, or local Kenyan coffee farmer, but Breyer 
gives no indication of how we should know whether the Appalachian 
potter could be subject to personal jurisdiction in neighboring North 
Carolina, in further-distant Florida, or in far-away California. This is 
because there is no single, precise answer to the question, How close is 
close enough?, and Justice Breyer would probably be nervous delivering 
any answer on either side of the imaginary line for fear that, in future 
cases, that line might be located elsewhere. His appeal to the status quo is 
disingenuous, for in a world where due process reigns, no rule is almost 
worse than picking the wrong rule.95 
The most notable feature of Justice Breyer’s hand-wringing is that he 
seems to have lost touch with the concept of specific jurisdiction as a tool 
with any utility in answering these questions. At one point he opines that 
adopting the dissenter’s view “would abandon the heretofore accepted 
inquiry of whether, focusing upon the relationship between ‘the 
defendant, the forum, and the litigation,’ it is fair, in light of the 
 
93 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2793. 
94 Id. at 2794. 
95 Professor Bloom has suggested that seemingly strict and rigid rules of 
jurisdiction actually mask a more flexible approach crafted to allow the judiciary 
ample space in creating jurisdictional doctrine. Cases like Nicastro show how easily the 
Court has been fooled by its own rhetoric of hard and inflexible rules, when in fact, 
“[p]ersonal jurisdiction is not some inevitable limit on judicial authority,” but instead 
is “a tool of subtle pliability and quiet discretion.” Bloom, supra note 5, at 1000.  
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defendant’s contacts with that forum, to subject the defendant to suit 
there.”96 In fact, Justice Breyer’s view diminishes the role of the 
relationship between the forum and the litigation to almost zero. As his 
italics demonstrate, he is concerned almost entirely with the relationship 
of the defendant to the forum. The litigation itself is an afterthought. 
This is evident in his concerns about future defendants. While he spills 
much ink wondering about the fate of a small and distant manufacturer, 
he says nothing about what the lawsuits might be in which they are 
potential defendants, and how those lawsuits might be related to the 
forum.97 
Thus, Breyer’s concurrence is almost as notable for what it omits as it 
is for what it discusses. The opinion is nearly devoid of a discussion of the 
relationship between J. McIntyre’s contact and the lawsuit.98 Breyer 
repeatedly emphasizes that J. McIntyre’s only contact with the state of 
New Jersey was the “single sale” of the machine that reached the state.99 
Gliding right past the McGee doctrine that a single contact with the forum 
can be a constitutionally sufficient minimum contact,100 Breyer concludes 
that “[n]one of [the Court’s] precedents finds that a single isolated 
sale . . . is sufficient.”101 Breyer thus seems to be more concerned with the 
relationship of the sale to the forum than with the relationship of the sale 
to the lawsuit. J. McIntyre manufactured and sold a large piece of highly 
sophisticated and dangerous machinery, a machine that stood at the 
center of the plaintiff’s lawsuit. In other words, the opinion does not 
investigate why any increase in marketing or targeting short of a direct 
sale into the forum state would change the relationship between this sale 
and this lawsuit for the purposes of specific jurisdiction. Instead, the 
reader is warned of unlimited jurisdiction over the poor potter at her 
wheel with no consideration of what role the hypothetical manufacture, 
distribution, and sale of her product would play in some unspecified 
future lawsuit. 
It is this failure that has led Justice Breyer down the path of decision 
paralysis, finding himself in a place where he is looking for an elusive 
“fixed ‘point’ between ‘unconstitutional’ and ‘merely undesirable’ [that] 
proves impossible to find.”102 Having stated the problem in terms that can 
never be answered to his satisfaction, he has marginalized the very 
concept of specific jurisdiction that could clarify the terms of the debate. 
 
96 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 
(1977)). 
97 See id. at 2791–94. 
98 See Steinman, supra note 3, at 490 (“Neither Justice Kennedy’s nor Justice 
Breyer’s opinion addresses this link between J. McIntyre’s own activities in the United 
States and the purchase of the machine by the New Jersey company for whom Mr. 
Nicastro worked.”). 
99 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2792. 
100 See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
101 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2792. 
102 Bloom, supra note 5, at 1000. 
Do Not Delete 7/15/2012  4:40 PM 
2012] THE RELATEDNESS PROBLEM 887 
Both Breyer and Kennedy fear that the wrong choice of a jurisdictional 
rule would result in an unacceptable violation of a defendant’s due 
process rights.103 One wonders, however, how the failure of the Court to 
provide any rule at all is any comfort to parties who should be able to 
depend on the stability and predictability of jurisdictional rules in 
planning their affairs.104 Lower courts are already split as to whether 
Breyer’s opinion means that the Court has rejected the Brennan stream 
of commerce position,105 or whether the Nicastro opinion is so narrow as 
to have little application beyond factual situations nearly identical to it.106 
Some even have dropped rather unsubtle hints of displeasure at the 
Court’s inability to reach a decision, stating, for example, that “McIntyre 
has little to no precedential value.”107 
 
103 See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion); id. at 2791 
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
104 See Rhodes, supra note 43, at 137 (suggesting that a “functional doctrine” of 
personal jurisdiction would include “some measure of predictability”). 
105 See Smith v. Teledyne Cont’l Motors, Inc., Civil Action No. 9:10cv2152, 2012 
WL 10836, at *3–4 (D.S.C. Jan. 3, 2012)(“Thus, six Justices agree that, at a minimum, 
the limitations of Justice O’Connor’s test should be applied . . . . Therefore the 
‘stream-of-commerce plus’ test now commands a majority of the Court.”); Windsor v. 
Spinner Indus. Co, 825 F. Supp.2d 632, 638 (D. Md. 2011) (“McIntyre clearly rejects 
foreseeability as the standard for personal jurisdiction.”). Some courts have read the 
case as rejecting the Brennan position as it would apply to a nationwide contacts 
theory. Compare Oticon v. Sebotek Hearing Sys., LLC., Civil Action No. 08–5489 
(FLW), 2011 WL 3702423, at *9 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 2011) (“[W]hether or not the 
plurality’s strict rule is the de-facto standard for stream-of-commerce cases going 
forward, there is no doubt that Nicastro stands for the proposition that targeting the 
national market is not enough to impute jurisdiction to all the forum States.”), with 
Eastman Chem. Co. v. AlphaPet Inc., Civ. Action No. 09–971–LPS–CJB, 2011 WL 
6004079, at *18 (D. Del. Nov. 4, 2011) (“Justice Breyer’s opinion (along with the 
three-justice dissent) suggests that intent to serve the national market, when coupled 
with other factors, remains a viable basis for the exercise of jurisdiction under stream-
of-commerce theory.”). 
106 See UTC Fire & Sec. Ams. Corp. v. NCS Power, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 
6692(LTS)(THK), 2012 WL 423349, at *9 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 10 2012) (“The plurality 
opinion . . . does not categorically foreclose the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
based on a ‘stream of commerce’ theory.”); Ainsworth v. Cargotec USA, Inc., Civil 
Action No. 2:10–CV–236–KS–MTP, 2011 WL 6291812, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 15, 2011) 
(holding that “Justice Breyer’s McIntyre opinion was only applicable to cases 
presenting the same factual scenario as that case,” and “declin[ing] to depart from 
the Fifth Circuit precedents holding that mere foreseeability is a constitutionally 
sufficient basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction under the stream-of-
commerce theory”); Original Creations, Inc. v. Ready Am., Inc., No. 11 C 3453, 2011 
WL 4738268, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 2011) (“[C]ase law utilizing [the stream of 
commerce] approach has been left undisturbed” because “the Nicastro Court does not 
discard [it].”). 
107 Ainsworth, 2011 WL 6291812, at * 4; see also Sieg v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No. 
3:10cv606, 2012 WL 610961, at *5 (M.D. Penn. Feb. 24, 2012) (“In light of the failure 
of a Supreme Court majority to adopt clearly one of the two Asahi standards, we will 
continue with the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ approach.”). 
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Justice Breyer, however, is not the lone culprit in this jurisdictional 
escapade. Justice Kennedy, by eliding the concepts of the relatedness of 
the defendant to the forum and the relatedness of the lawsuit to the 
forum into strict and probably unhelpful rules of sovereignty, has allowed 
others’ attention to wander from the quandary of specific jurisdiction. 
The dissenters, meanwhile, missed an opportunity to seize on the virtues 
of specific jurisdiction to solidify Justice Brennan’s stream of commerce 
theory into a workable and appealing doctrine.  Some clues to solving the 
mystery may be found in the Court’s Goodyear decision. 
2. Goodyear Dunlop Tires v. Brown 
On some levels, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,108 
succeeded where Nicastro failed.109 Nicastro, with its 4–2–3 opinion, did not 
do anything to solve the persistent stream of commerce problem in 
personal jurisdiction, and arguably left the doctrine even worse off than 
it had been after Asahi in 1987. Contrast this muddled state of affairs with 
the orderly and unanimous opinion in Goodyear, and it can be hard to 
believe that the two opinions were the product of the same court on the 
same day. The most obvious difference between the two cases is that 
Goodyear is a general jurisdiction case and Nicastro a specific jurisdiction 
case. These differences, however, also extend to how the Court perceived 
and responded to the relatedness problem. 
Von Mehren and Trautman’s terminology forms the starting point 
for Justice Ginsburg’s analysis.110 The plaintiffs’ claims in Goodyear did not 
involve “adjudication of ‘issues deriving from, or connected with, the very 
controversy that establishes jurisdiction.’”111 Thus, the North Carolina 
court would need general jurisdiction over the defendants in order to 
exercise personal jurisdiction. Having identified general jurisdiction as 
the proper mode of analysis,112 the Court could proceed to analyze the 
only relevant dimension of relatedness: the relationship of the defendant 
to the forum. The bus accident in which the plaintiffs perished took 
place in Paris, France, and the allegedly defective tires responsible for the 
accident were manufactured and distributed entirely within Europe.113 
However, because the Court carefully delineated this case as one of 
general jurisdiction, these facts are not used to distance the defendants 
 
108 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
109 See Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of “Essentially at Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 
S.C. L. REV. 527, 528 (2012) (“I believe that the case will prove to be one of the wisest 
and most consequential jurisdictional decisions in recent years.”). 
110 Goodyear Dunlop, 131 S. Ct. at 2851. 
111 Id. at 2851 (quoting von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 19, at 1136). 
112 Id. at 2853. 
113 Id. at 2851–52. 
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from the forum state. Rather, Justice Ginsburg simply treats these facts as 
irrelevant.114  
The Court then considered the relationship of Goodyear’s three 
European subsidiaries to the forum. The Court held that, although a 
small percentage of the European tires were distributed in North 
Carolina, the subsidiaries did not have the sort of systematic and 
continuous contact with the forum and therefore were not “fairly 
regarded as at home” in North Carolina.115 Their connections to the state 
were “attenuated” and “f[e]ll far short of ‘the continuous and systematic 
general business contacts’ necessary to empower North Carolina to 
entertain suit against them on claims unrelated to anything that connects 
them to the State.”116 
The unanimity in Goodyear thus extends beyond the holding and 
even the reasoning of the case. The Justices have agreed on three distinct 
fronts. First, they agreed on the terms of the debate: this is a case about 
general jurisdiction. Second, they agreed on the issue to be resolved: this 
case requires an investigation of any and all contacts that the defendants 
had with the forum.  Finally, they agreed on the answer : Based on their 
business activities, the defendants did not have systematic and continuous 
contact with the forum state and were not at home there. Because 
Goodyear did not involve any contacts that were related to the lawsuit, 
there was no risk of the pesky fact that part of the defendants’ contact 
with North Carolina, no matter how small, was somehow related to the 
plaintiffs’ misfortune.117 This cleared the way for Justice Ginsburg to view 
the defendant’s contacts with some distance. 
The opinion is not perfect. Going forward, one can expect further 
debate and development in the lower courts as to what it means for a 
defendant to be “at home” in a forum state.118 Other commentators will 
address that issue ably.119 Thus, I will confine my comments here to the 
impact that the relatedness problem will have on this analysis. Solving the 
problem of where (and when) a corporation is “at home” will require 
answering a version of the question, How close is close enough? The 
Court has provided answers for the easier cases: a corporation that has its 
 
114 Id. at 2851 (“Because the episode-in-suit, the bus accident, occurred in France, 
and the tire alleged to have caused the accident was manufactured and sold abroad, 
North Carolina courts lacked specific jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy.”). 
115 Id. at 2854–58. 
116 Id. at 2857 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 
408, 416 (1984)). 
117 One arguable contact with the forum was the fact that the plaintiffs were 
residents of North Carolina. However, this relationship between the plaintiff and the 
forum is lawsuit specific and therefore not within the province of general jurisdiction. 
118 See Michael H. Hoffheimer, General Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 K.U. L. REV. 549, 551 (2012) (arguing that 
the Goodyear court “achieved consensus because it can be read in radically different 
ways”). 
119 See Stein, supra note 109. 
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headquarters or major facilities in a state is “at home” there, as is an 
entity that has organized under the laws of a forum state.120 An entity is 
not at home when it does not have any operations in the state, and the 
only sales of its products into the forum state are indirect sales that 
represent a very small part of the entity’s overall business.121 At a certain 
point, however, courts will need to confront the question whether 
entities that make some direct sales in a forum state or that have smaller 
numbers of employees or offices in a state are subject to general 
jurisdiction. 
A few features of general jurisdiction analysis increase the likelihood 
that these inquiries will not result in total doctrinal gridlock. First, the 
metric for relatedness is relatively clear and unidimensional. Courts will 
need to address the relative volume of the various contacts, but with the 
focus unclouded by the relationship of each contact to the lawsuit, courts 
can systematically investigate the importance and weight of each contact 
with the forum, and the combined impact of any and all contacts put 
together.  
Second, general jurisdiction analysis cast in these terms is a much 
better subject for application of the rule and results to other cases. The 
most obvious example is how courts can apply findings of general 
jurisdiction to repeat players in litigation.122 If general jurisdiction is truly 
general, a finding regarding the amenability of a business entity to 
jurisdiction in a state in one lawsuit should transfer seamlessly to others. 
To the extent that different judges can, and perhaps should, disagree on 
the application of general jurisdiction to smaller entities at the margins, 
appellate courts can take the opportunity to let competing holdings 
develop in the trial courts and then resolve differences through appellate 
opinions of cases where there is a solid factual record from the lower 
court. The findings of general jurisdiction should also be easier to apply 
across different defendants of similar size and contact, so long as the 
courts writing the opinions follow Justice Ginsburg’s lead and are clear 
about which contacts count and why.  
 
120 Goodyear Dunlop, 131 S. Ct. at 2853–54 (noting that an entity is subject to 
personal jurisdiction where it is domiciled). The Goodyear decision does not appear to 
disturb the understanding that, unlike the principal place of business for purposes of 
domicile under § 1332, a non-natural person might have more than one domicile. 28 
U.S.C. § 1332 (2006). It also does not appear to dictate that the § 1332(c) definition 
of principal place of business be determined by the “nerve center” test defined in 
Hertz v. Friend for purposes of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 
130 S. Ct. 1181, 1193–94 (2010). But see Stein, supra note 109, at 538 (advocating a 
definition of “at home” based on a singular “citizen-like affiliation” with the forum 
state). 
121 Goodyear Dunlop, 131 S. Ct. at 2853–54. 
122 See Lawrence E. Rothstein, The Myth of Sisyphus: Legal Services Efforts on Behalf of 
the Poor, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 493, 501 (1974) (“The large-volume litigant is able to 
achieve the most favorable forum . . . [by] tak[ing] advantage of differences in 
procedure among courts at the state and federal levels . . . to encourage assumption 
of jurisdiction in higher courts.”). 
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Third, these inquiries will be at their most useful if the courts let go 
of the idea that there is a single, ideal, Platonic form of general 
jurisdiction that will suddenly announce itself if the courts wait long and 
hard enough. Approaching the line between “close enough” and “not 
close enough” asymptotically is a perfectly reasonable exercise for the 
common law development of the rule and its application to individual 
cases. Thus, despite the vagaries of the “at home” question, Goodyear has 
successfully created space for courts to define the contours of general 
jurisdiction in a more organized fashion. More importantly, by speaking 
with a unanimous voice in defining the terms of the debate, the Court 
has shown a commitment to moving beyond decision paralysis, if only in 
one part of personal jurisdiction doctrine. 
The problem, of course, is that general jurisdiction does not tell the 
whole story. Specific jurisdiction will continue to be an important part of 
the jurisdictional story, especially if Goodyear has the effect of tightening 
the boundaries of general jurisdiction.123 If the only way the Court can 
avoid decision paralysis is to effectively excise the difficult relatedness 
problem from the picture altogether, there is no reason to believe that it 
will be able to move beyond the relatedness problem in specific 
jurisdiction. Once the Court has chosen specific jurisdiction for its model 
of how much of personal jurisdiction will be exercised, it must confront 
head-on the questions of why and how the relationship between the 
lawsuit and the forum state matter. 
II. RETURNING TO SPECIFIC JURISDICTION  
The Supreme Court has come to a standstill on how to cope with the 
stream of commerce problem in personal jurisdiction. Aside from 
concluding in Goodyear that the Brennan stream of commerce doctrine is 
insufficient for general jurisdiction purposes,124 Nicastro left the stream of 
commerce problem mostly unresolved. In this Part, I call on the courts to 
reinvigorate the concept of specific jurisdiction, to squarely confront why 
a relationship between the lawsuit and the forum matters, and to 
delineate how that relationship should be considered in personal 
jurisdiction analysis.  
As a technical matter, courts have not literally forgotten about 
specific jurisdiction. If anything, specific jurisdiction has become so 
pervasive that its existence is taken as a given.125 Currently, the Supreme 
Court appears to treat specific jurisdiction as an uncontroversial premise 
rather than a conclusion to be reached. Lower courts are also sometimes 
guilty of this phenomenon, and “[i]n many cases . . . courts fail to 
 
123 See Twitchell, supra note 7, at 680. 
124 Goodyear Dunlop, 131 S. Ct. at 2854–57. 
125 See id. at 2854 (“Since International Shoe, this Court’s decisions have elaborated 
primarily on circumstances that warrant the exercise of specific jurisdiction . . . .”). 
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mention the specific/general distinction and relatedness.”126 Treating 
specific jurisdiction as an uninteresting premise, however, can weaken 
the very foundation of that premise, because “the assertion that suits 
must be related to the affiliating conduct simply restates the issue, it does 
not explain why this must be so.”127 
In Goodyear, Justice Ginsburg accuses the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals of “[c]onfusing or blending general and specific jurisdictional 
inquiries,”128 but, of course, this is precisely what went wrong in Nicastro. 
Without a theory of specific jurisdiction to guide them, the plurality 
appealed to more global notions of sovereignty and federalism to 
vacillate between the importance of the connection of the lawsuit and the 
forum and the contacts that the defendant had with the forum more 
generally.129 
The first task is to recognize the analytical distinction between the 
two dimensions of relatedness outlined in Part I. Addressing separately 
the relatedness of the lawsuit to the forum does not diminish the 
importance of assessing a defendant’s connection with the forum itself. 
However, a specific jurisdiction theory needs a clear account of why a 
defendant’s connection with the forum is important. Any robust specific 
jurisdiction theory will need to “account for why some contacts are more 
jurisdictionally significant than others.”130 If it is only important because 
of its connection to the lawsuit, the connection between the lawsuit and 
the forum must be clarified. If, however, there is some other reason to 
value a defendant’s contacts (or lack of contacts) with the forum that 
have only a tenuous connection to the lawsuit, then these purposes also 
must be clarified. 
A. Avoiding Abstract Relatedness Questions 
Refocusing specific jurisdiction analysis requires more than simply 
teasing out specific jurisdiction from general jurisdiction. It will also 
mean that the Court needs to construct specific jurisdiction doctrine in a 
way that avoids abstract relatedness inquiries. Abstract relatedness 
inquiries occur when courts attempt to answer generalized questions 
about how claims, parties, or lawsuits are related without prior agreement 
on why those questions are being asked or how they should be answered. 
The relatedness problem has been explored to the extent that it 
intersects with similar problems in substantive areas of law, such as the 
 
126 Rose, supra note 14, at 1557. 
127 Perdue, supra note 4, at 543. 
128 Goodyear Dunlop, 131 S. Ct. at 2851. 
129 This uncertainty extends to state court decisions as well. See Rhodes, supra 
note 43, at 139 (“[D]espite the preeminence of the contacts analysis in jurisdictional 
queries, confusion regarding the appropriate parameters of specific and general 
jurisdiction plagues the jurisprudence of many states.”). 
130 Stein, supra note 27, at 418. 
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causation problem in torts.131 I would like to suggest, however, that there 
is a particular procedural dimension to the relatedness problem, and that 
attention to this issue is long overdue. 
The relatedness problem in civil procedure occurs whenever a court 
must answer the question: How common is common enough? This 
question possesses the unfortunate quality of being both impossible to 
avoid and nearly impossible to answer. For example, the joinder rules, 
particularly as they are drafted for use in the federal courts depend on 
whether claims or parties meet threshold of relatedness.132  
One only needs to take a few steps into the world of joinder devices 
before encountering the relatedness problem. The relatedness problem 
in joinder is easy enough to understand. If the purpose of joinder devices 
is to package claims and parties for the fair and efficient resolution of 
controversies,133 then one needs a clear sense of which claims and which 
parties fit together. Several joinder devices rely upon the standards of 
“transaction or occurrence” or “common question of law or fact” to 
determine relatedness. The commonalities approach has not produced a 
coherent standard or approach to the relatedness problem in joinder, 
and judicial opinions applying the “transaction or occurrence”134 and 
“common question of law or fact”135 standard are notorious for a lack of 
coherence within each joinder device and across the joinder devices in 
which those phrases are used. 
Despite the repeated use of the “transaction or occurrence”136 and 
“common question of law or fact” language,137 the definitions of these 
terms are notoriously elusive. One judicial strategy has been to define a 
phrase simply by reference to another standard. For example, a classic 
definition states that claims arise from the same “transaction or 
occurrence” if the claims bear a “logical relationship” to one another.138 
The “logical relationship” test gives about as much content to 
 
131 See, e.g., Rose, supra note 14, at 1577–78. 
132 See Effron, supra note 10, at 762, 770–73. 
133 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal 
Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 107 (1989); 
Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiff Autonomy and the 
Court’s Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 809, 813 (1989); Mary Kay 
Kane, Original Sin and the Transaction in Federal Civil Procedure, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1723, 
1728–29 (1998); John C. McCoid, A Single Package for Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. 
REV. 707, 710 (1976). 
134 FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a). 
135 FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a). 
136 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a)(1)(A) (A claim that “arises out of the transaction 
or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim” is compulsory.); 
FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) (Relation back of amended complaints is permitted under a 
“conduct, transaction or occurrence” standard.). 
137 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a) (permissive joinder); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) 
(class actions); FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b) (intervenors); FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) (consolidation 
by the court). 
138 See Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926). 
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“transaction or occurrence” as “purposeful availment” does to “minimum 
contacts,” yet courts persist in using it as both argument and 
conclusion.139 Another strategy seems, at first, hardly to be a strategy at 
all: ignoring or brushing aside the scatter plot of seemingly dissonant 
joinder decisions, the inconsistencies of which are explained away by 
vague references to the need for broad judicial discretion in the case-
management context.140 
In my previous work, I have suggested that these and other variations 
are not simply the product of fact-specific situations and discretionary 
decision-making. Instead, they are the result of the failed commonalities 
approach to joinder. In place of the relatedness standards, the courts 
have developed shadow rules of joinder that loosely govern the standard 
for various joinder devices.141 While courts have avoided directly 
addressing the relatedness question, one can still identify patterns in 
joinder decisions. It is from these patterns that two shadow rules of 
joinder emerge.142 The shadow rules demonstrate that some judges are 
anxious to dispense with the commonalities problem and focus instead 
on the more practical concerns implicated by the various joinder 
devices.143 Joinder thus demonstrates that the relatedness problem is 
nearly impossible to answer with a simple, easily identifiable, bright-line 
rule. Because judges understand that the broad question, Are these 
claims (or parties) related? is impossible to answer in a principled and 
generalizable way, they have spurned careful engagement with the 
relatedness problem as a whole. 
This sort of decision avoidance is problematic, as are the shadow 
rules of joinder it has produced. The shadow rules represent a large lack 
of transparency in joinder decisions. The most obvious way in which 
joinder decisions lack transparency is the want of a meaningful or 
identifiable standard for “transaction or occurrence” or “common 
question of law or fact.” The standards defining these phrases are elusive 
and opaque. There is, however, another level at which these decisions 
lack transparency: the veil of discretion masks a variety of deeper 
underlying concerns. A decision that supposedly investigates relatedness 
might actually reflect a court’s opinion on the desirability of certain 
causes of action, on whether a defendant should be entitled to repose in 
a given situation, or on whether litigating the claims of several plaintiffs 
together would in fact be more efficient during motion practice, 
 
139 See C. Douglas Floyd, Three Faces of Supplemental Jurisdiction After the Demise of 
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 60 FLA. L. REV. 277, 291–92 (2008); Douglas D. 
McFarland, Seeing the Forest for the Trees: The Transaction of Occurrence and the Claim 
Interlock Civil Procedure, 12 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 247, 262 (2011). 
140 See Effron, supra note 10, at 769. 
141 See generally Effron, supra note 10. 
142 Specifically, redescription and implied predominance. For a discussion of 
redescription, see id. at 773–789. For a discussion of implied predominance, see id. at 
789–804. 
143 Id. at 809. 
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discovery, or trial. In other words, the commonalities approach hides 
more nuanced concerns specific to each joinder device, but also hides 
judicial sentiments regarding the relative desirability of certain causes of 
action or feelings about groups of claimants. Judges might even dispense 
with the relatedness inquiry entirely when it does not suit them.144 
Beyond the lack of transparency, the shadow rules have produced an 
absence of predictability in joinder decisions—a state of affairs that is 
particularly problematic for the joinder devices bound up with res judicata 
and the associated values of finality, repose, and the ability to bring a 
claim.145 
The good news about the shadow rules of joinder is that they show 
that even if the relatedness question is impossible to answer at the 
margins, this is not a fatal flaw because there are other questions with 
answers that can supply judges with the relevant information to make 
their decisions. That is, decision avoidance of the relatedness problem is 
neither necessary nor preferable. The shadow rules of joinder have 
emerged for several complex reasons, one of which is the poor fit 
between the text of the joinder rules and the underlying purpose of each 
joinder device. The purposes of compulsory counterclaims are not 
coextensive with those of permitting the joinder of parties or the 
amendment of complaints with otherwise time-barred claims. If joinder 
rules were rewritten with targeted standards to better reflect these 
concerns, then joinder opinions might begin to show a uniformity of 
reasoning within the fact-bound and case-management-rich environment 
in which trial judges work.146 
The commonalities approach to joinder has failed because of a poor 
fit between the questions that the standards ask and the purpose that 
each joinder device is meant to serve. Trying to give general answers to 
the question, Are these claims or parties related? does not answer the 
very real and often differing questions underlying each joinder device, 
such as: Would it be fair to the defendant to prepare a new defense  
to a new claim?, Would discovery be more efficient if these parties  
are joined in a single lawsuit?, Will these causes of action have a 
meaningful overlap in motion practice?, or Should the defendant be 
required to bring its claim at a time and in a forum that the plaintiff has 
chosen? In other words, relatedness itself is not what matters in joinder; 
rather, it is the consequences of certain types of relatedness in certain 
circumstances that matters. 
 
144 For example, in Pendrell v. Chatham College, 386 F. Supp. 341, 344–46 (W.D. Pa. 
1974), the District Court found that two claims were unrelated, despite arising from 
nearly identical facts. This is a clue that even when the commonalities question is 
technically answerable, it does not answer the concerns that underlie particular joinder 
devices, in this case, Rule 15(c). 
145 See Effron, supra note 10, at 811, 815. 
146 Id. at 814–18. 
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The lesson for personal jurisdiction is that courts do not do well 
when they try to answer generalized and unfocused relatedness 
questions.147 The current specific jurisdiction doctrine as articulated by 
Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer in their respective Nicastro opinions 
makes precisely this mistake. However, this also means that it might be 
possible to right the ship of specific jurisdiction merely by asking good 
and focused specific jurisdiction questions and without freezing at a total 
impasse imposed by the search for the perfectly crafted theoretical 
underpinnings for this basis of jurisdiction. 
B. Refocusing Specific Jurisdiction Analysis 
Just as I have advocated rethinking the rules of joinder to craft better 
standards that fit the purposes of each joinder device, I would suggest 
that specific jurisdiction analysis be subject to a similar refocusing of 
standard and purpose. In other words, instead of asking the 
overwhelming question of what it means for a case to be related to the 
forum, courts should be asking why this case is related to this forum. This 
will mean significantly refocusing the specific jurisdiction debate on 
specific jurisdiction concerns.  
A return to the basic premises of specific jurisdiction does not mean 
that the Court has to promulgate a single, all-encompassing, and 
definitive theory of jurisdiction. In fact, the search for a unifying theory 
can be an unnecessary distraction, as it forces the Court to shoehorn 
older (and possibly inconsistent) precedent into a unifying rationale 
while simultaneously worrying about whether the theory can 
accommodate an infinite combination of future factual scenarios. For 
example, as Professor Stein has observed, some theories like the 
“exchange” theory of purposeful availment, have “sidetracked the courts 
into an empty analysis of jurisdiction based on whether defendant 
received sufficient benefits from his contacts with the forum.”148 Concepts 
like the exchange theory seem empty precisely because they are devoid of 
what makes specific jurisdiction specific—the ties between lawsuit and 
the forum. A theory that is focused on the defendant at the expense of 
focusing on the lawsuit will inevitably come across as unwieldy and 
overbroad. 
Justice Kennedy’s emphasis on sovereignty is a similar red herring. 
Although state power and sovereignty might ultimately be one legitimate 
choice for the theoretical grounding of personal jurisdiction as a 
 
147 The doctrinal difficulties inherent in defining the boundaries of a lawsuit are 
especially apparent when a court must decide whether ancillary claims over which it 
would not ordinarily have personal jurisdiction are part of the same lawsuit and 
therefore might be heard under a theory of “pendant personal jurisdiction.” See 
generally Linda Sandstrom Simard, Exploring the Limits of Specific Personal Jurisdiction, 62 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1619 (2001). 
148 Stein, supra note 27, at 418. 
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whole,149 Kennedy does not supply criteria for distinguishing between 
difficult specific jurisdiction cases. The reader hears plenty about the 
importance of purposeful availment and targeting, but has no sense of 
whether those activities, as connected with this particular lawsuit, are of 
any importance, nor of whether different contacts in a different lawsuit 
can or should be evaluated. Similarly, Kennedy does not make use of 
commentary discussing the interplay of interstate federalism and the 
assertion of personal jurisdiction.150 Several of these theories contain 
detailed investigations of how a forum regulates a defendant’s conduct 
through litigation, by ex ante incentives and signals or by ex post 
enforcement.151 These theories demand that courts ask precise and 
targeted questions about specific jurisdiction because they tie the power 
of the court in a particular forum to the particular conduct of the 
defendant, and then tie the conduct of the defendant to the actual 
lawsuit at hand. What Kennedy’s opinion is missing, then, is not only a 
justification of why sovereignty matters, but a justification of why and how 
sovereignty and power should matter to the exercise of specific 
jurisdiction. 
All of this means that courts—particularly the Supreme Court—will 
need to become more comfortable with a reality of specific jurisdiction 
that has already emerged—that is that different types of cases will be 
subject to different inquiries about relatedness. With regard to the 
stream of commerce cases, the Kennedy plurality and the Breyer 
concurrence have lost sight of why sending a defective product into a 
forum state matters. Until that question is answered, general appeals to 
sovereignty, power over the defendant, and undirected observations 
about “purposeful availment” and “targeting” will continue to confuse 
and divide the Court, as will worries about the fates of unspecified future 
defendants in unknown future lawsuits, an unfocused concern that 
results from a “pervasive . . . analytical framework” that is “uniformly 
defendant-oriented.”152 
In a sense, the problem as currently formulated requires courts to 
answer the following questions: In light of the fact that a defendant’s 
product has found its way into the forum state, what is the defendant’s 
relationship to the forum? Has it been “nudged across the line” from too 
 
149 See Steinman, supra note 3, at 492 (“Many of the principles on which Justice 
Kennedy relies are not fundamentally inconsistent with a more lenient approach [to 
jurisdiction].”). 
150 For an example of commentary discussing the interplay of interstate federalism 
and the assertion of personal jurisdiction, see Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 
EMORY L.J. 1, 7 (2010) (suggesting that principles of horizontal federalism can supply 
a useful framework for understanding personal jurisdiction). See generally Spencer, 
supra note 14. 
151 See Brilmayer, supra note 7, at 1449; Stein, supra note 27, at 416–24 (advocating 
a regulatory precision theory). 
152 Mullenix, supra note 25, at 364. 
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attenuated to close enough?153 As we have seen, courts are not eager to 
answer these generalized questions of relatedness that smack of a futile 
exercise in line drawing. Instead, courts’ inquiries should be directed 
toward discerning what is central and what is peripheral in a lawsuit. 
There is a lesson here for how courts should formulate the problem. 
Currently, there is a debate in the lower courts about how relatedness 
should be defined. The various lower courts have provided differing 
answers. Some courts require that the contacts should be sufficiently 
“related” to the cause of action, while others require that the contacts 
“arise out of” the cause of action.154 Still others have turned to standards, 
such as a tort-like “but for” causation standard.155 
It might be, however, that these debates matter very little to the 
ultimate shape of specific jurisdiction. The choice of “arise out of” might, 
in theory, be a narrower exercise of specific jurisdiction than “related 
to,”156 but the language is irrelevant if courts treat the standard as a 
generalized relatedness question that cannot be answered in a 
meaningful way. Just as “transaction or occurrence” has come to mean 
very little, so has the “arise out of” and “related to” language failed to 
gain much traction or prominence in the larger debates about 
jurisdictional limits.157 
III. WHY NATIONWIDE CONTACTS MATTER 
In Nicastro, the role of national contacts forms a major point of 
disagreement between Justice Kennedy and Justice Ginsburg. Justice 
Kennedy, firmly insists upon a “forum-by-forum” analysis, demanding 
that jurisdiction is proper only when “a defendant has followed a course 
of conduct directed at the society or economy existing within the 
jurisdiction of a given sovereign.”158 Acknowledging that J. McIntyre did 
in fact “direct[] marketing and sales efforts at the United States,” 
Kennedy concludes that the defendant’s “purposeful contacts with New 
 
153 Here I borrow from the Court’s now-famous language describing how 
plaintiffs must plead sufficient facts to “nudge[] their claims across the line from 
conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The 
recent pleading cases are another example of a quixotic line-drawing exercise, and 
one that has been severely criticized in academic circles. 
154 See Borchers, supra note 38, at 126–27 (noting different standards used by 
lower courts); Freer, supra note 14, at 29 (discussing the difference between the 
“related to” and “arising out of” standards); Rose, supra note 14, at 1577 (discussing 
how courts assess the causal relationship between contacts and cause of action in 
order to determine relatedness); Stein, supra note 27, at 442 (stating that courts are 
unclear whether to apply a “related to” or “arising out of” standard). 
155 See Rose, supra note 14 at 1568–70. 
156 See Borchers, supra note 38, at 126–27. 
157 See Douglas D. McFarland, In Search of the Transaction or Occurrence: 
Counterclaims, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 699, 701 (2007). 
158 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011). 
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Jersey, not with the United States, . . . alone are relevant.”159 Justice 
Ginsburg, on the other hand, embraces the relevance of targeting the 
U.S. market as a whole, finding that J. McIntyre took “purposeful step[s] 
to reach customers for its products anywhere in the United States. . . . 
Given McIntyre UK’s endeavors to reach and profit from the United 
States market as a whole, Nicastro’s suit, I would hold, has been brought 
in a forum entirely appropriate for the adjudication of his claim.”160 
Justice Ginsburg prominently displays the fact that her conclusion is 
a result of Nicastro’s status as a specific jurisdiction case, stating that the 
defendant “surely is not subject to general (all-purpose) jurisdiction . . . . 
The question, rather, is one of specific jurisdiction . . . .”161 Ginsburg then 
carefully examines the relationship of J. McIntyre to the lawsuit, and the 
relationship of the lawsuit to the forum: 
The machine arrived in Nicastro’s New Jersey workplace not 
randomly or fortuitously, but as a result of the U.S. connections and 
distribution system that McIntyre UK deliberately arranged. On 
what sensible view of the allocation of adjudicatory authority could 
the place of Nicastro’s injury within the United States be deemed 
off limits for his products liability claim against a foreign 
manufacturer who targeted the United States (including all the 
States that constitute the Nation) as the territory it sought to 
develop?162 
In other words, it is the concept of specific jurisdiction itself that allows 
Ginsburg to overcome the sovereignty hurdle placed in front of her by 
Justice Kennedy.163 Ginsburg makes astute observations about modern 
commerce, noting, for example, that “[t]his case is illustrative of 
marketing arrangements for sales in the United States common in 
today’s commercial world,”164 and that “McIntyre UK dealt with the 
United States as a single market.”165 These facts, however, are only as 
meaningful as the strength of their relationship to the controversy at 
hand.  
This is why Ginsburg’s emphasis on the details of the Nicastro lawsuit 
itself is so important. Having stressed that the injury took place in New 
Jersey with a machine manufactured by the defendant for use in any U.S. 
state including New Jersey,166 Justice Ginsburg closes the specific 
jurisdiction loop, overcoming the perception that the activity has “a 
 
159 Id. at 2790. 
160 Id. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
161 Id.  
162 Id. (footnote omitted). 
163 Justice Brennan’s Asahi opinion “discarded the central concept of sovereign 
authority in favor of fairness and foreseeability considerations.” Id. at 2783 (Kennedy, 
J., plurality opinion); see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 
116–21 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
164 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
165 Id. at 2801. 
166 Id. at 2800–02. 
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ubiquity that defies geographical boundaries.”167 Just as defendant’s 
contacts with a forum do not hew neatly to state boundaries, the 
boundaries of the lawsuit itself are similarly fluid.168 The conduct and 
events that lead to lawsuits are rarely confined to state borders. Indeed, 
entire doctrinal fields, such as choice of law, are dedicated to this fact.169 
In future cases, courts should further sharpen this argument. When 
courts stress that some defendants have directed their behavior at a 
national or regional area, and this observation is unconnected from the 
specifics of the lawsuit at hand, the consequences for future defendants 
seem scary and unconstrained. It can be easy to lapse into Justice Breyer’s 
mindset of projecting general jurisdiction fears onto a specific 
jurisdiction case.  
National contacts matter, however, not just because this is a modern 
reality of how a defendant might relate to a forum, but because it is a 
modern reality of how a lawsuit might relate to the forum. The contacts 
that a court would consider might apply with equal force to a lawsuit 
brought in another forum. Kennedy’s mistake is to conclude that this fact 
diminishes the force that those contacts have in the forum at hand.170 
Ginsburg’s major insight is that specific jurisdiction transforms free-
floating contacts with the United States (or a smaller region therein) into 
meaningful minimum contacts with the forum.171 
If this project is to be successful, courts must begin to treat specific 
jurisdiction as a conclusion rather than a premise, and to give the facts of 
each lawsuit the respect they deserve instead of treating specific 
jurisdiction as if it were an undifferentiated, residual category that is an 
alternative to general jurisdiction. This path is already well trod, and 
scholars such as Lea Brilmayer have already paid ample attention to the 
 
167 Spencer, supra note 61, at 87 (describing problems with Internet jurisdiction). 
168 See Jamelle C. Sharpe, Beyond Borders: Disassembling the State-Based Model of 
Federal Forum Fairness, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2897, 2900 n.10 (2009). 
169 For this reason, several commentators have suggested that courts raise the 
prominence of choice of law analysis in resolving personal jurisdiction doctrines. See, 
e.g., Perdue, supra note 4, at 562 (“[T]he most likely basis for any significant personal 
jurisdiction limitation is choice of law.”); Rose, supra note 14, at 1564 (“[O]ne of the 
major roles personal jurisdiction plays in American law is a backstop for choice of law, 
[because of the] strong tendency to apply the law of the forum.”) (footnote omitted); 
Spencer, supra note 14, at 659 (“Although the Court has consistently rejected the 
relevance of choice-of-law analysis to determinations of personal jurisdiction, that 
position will inevitably have to be reconsidered.”); Russell J. Weintraub, Due Process 
Limitations on the Personal Jurisdiction of State Courts: Time for Change, 63 OR. L. REV. 485, 
524 (1984) (“Perhaps the most important element of forum unfairness to defendant 
involves choice of law.”). 
170 See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2790–91 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion). 
171 Id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Conceptualizing jurisdiction in this way 
might alleviate concerns that the Brennan test would impose on defendants an 
affirmative duty to “avoid jurisdiction.” See Stein, supra note 27, at 452. In other words, 
any duty to avoid jurisdiction in a state only follows logically after the defendant has 
taken affirmative steps to target that state by including it in a targeted region as a 
whole. 
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nuances of related contacts in personal jurisdiction.172 With serious 
theories of relatedness in personal jurisdiction already on the table, the 
time is ripe for courts to begin applying them in earnest. 
To illustrate, imagine Company X, a manufacturer akin to J. 
McIntyre. The United States as a whole is one of Company X’s targeted 
markets. Its machines adhere to American standards, it has engaged an 
exclusive distributor to sell its products in the United States, and 
representatives from Company X have met with various industry 
executives at relevant industry conventions in typical convention cities 
such as Chicago or Las Vegas. Justices Kennedy and Breyer are 
concerned that based upon these facts alone, Company X is now subject 
to jurisdiction in all fifty states. These facts, however, are closer to what 
one would expect from a general jurisdiction analysis. 
The purpose of specific jurisdiction analysis would be to shift the 
focus away from the defendant, once nationwide contacts have 
established that Company X has indeed targeted the individual 
jurisdictions where its products are foreseeably sold.173 A doctrine of 
nationwide contacts does not end the personal jurisdiction analysis, but is 
an invitation to a court to begin a second front of the relatedness inquiry 
by looking at the relationship of the lawsuit to the forum. A finding that 
J. McIntyre is subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey for a machine 
sold in that forum and causing injury in that forum does not mean that a 
court in Delaware could have permissibly exercised jurisdiction over that 
case with the New Jersey facts. 
This does mean that J. McIntyre is potentially subject to jurisdiction 
in many states, but it is not subject to jurisdiction in the haphazard and 
unpredictable way that Kennedy and Breyer fear. Rather, because each 
incidence of jurisdiction is tied to particular facts of particular lawsuits that 
have a connection with the forum, the defendant has an appreciable 
connection with the forum that goes well beyond a mere failure to avoid 
jurisdiction by barring its products from entering the state. 
Moreover, the more one engages with the facts of a particular 
lawsuit, the more judges can distinguish individual cases and find 
limiting principles. For example, a component manufacturer whose 
products are incorporated into products for myriad markets and whose 
products bear no indicia that they are designed specifically with the U.S. 
 
172 See e.g., Brilmayer, supra note 7, at 1455–58 (suggesting a standard of 
“substantive legal relevance” for determining related contacts). 
173 An Illinois state appellate court hearing a case post-Nicastro has already 
indicated a willingness to interpret the decision to mean that “all the justices found 
that distribution by an American distributor in the states could be sufficient to 
establish jurisdiction, given the right set of facts.” Russell v. SNFA, No. 1–09–3012, 
2011 WL 6965795, at *8 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 16, 2011), appeal allowed, No. 113909, 2012 
Ill. LEXIS 754 (Ill. May 30, 2012); see also King v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 5:11–cv–
2269–AKK, 2012 WL 1340066, at *8 (N.D. Ala., Apr. 18, 2012) (holding, post-Nicastro 
that GM Canada targeted Alabama when targeting the U.S. market because “if not 
Alabama, what market does GM Canada serve?”). 
Do Not Delete 7/15/2012  4:40 PM 
902 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:3 
market in mind might fail a “nationwide contacts” test to begin with. 
Additionally, a lawsuit involving a product in a jurisdiction with a very 
weak connection to the injury might not be sufficient.  
Conversely, a strong connection between the lawsuit and the forum 
is not a substitute for any connection at all between the defendant and 
the forum. Suppose a product manufactured by one of Justice Breyer’s 
hypothetical local artisans is purchased in a local market and then taken 
by the plaintiff to the forum state where an accident happened. This sort 
of “unilateral activity” by the plaintiff is not affected by a nationwide 
contacts analysis if the defendant never engaged in activity that would 
qualify as nationwide targeting in the first place. If, however, the 
defendant has sold products for use in certain geographical areas, such 
as specialized racing boats that it knew consumers would use in New York 
races, this fact of mere foreseeability should not be a barrier to the 
exercise of jurisdiction.174 
There will always be cases at the margins of relatedness, and the 
nationwide contacts doctrine does not dispense with these line-drawing 
issues. I would argue, for example, that the facts of World-Wide Volkswagen 
will always be vexing because the argument that a regional retailer should 
be able to cabin its activities is just as compelling an argument as is the 
fact that cars can and should be taken to far away places where they 
might cause great damage to persons and property in another 
jurisdiction. The goal is not to erase the difficulties posed by cases at the 
margins, but to convince the Court that it can articulate a specific 
jurisdiction doctrine that breaks down the relatedness question into 
manageable constituent parts, and to further convince the Court that it 
may entrust the common law development of the doctrine’s factual 
borders to the state and district courts who hear the cases and develop 
the record.  
For this reason, I believe that an application of Justice Brennan’s 
stream of commerce approach provides the strongest basis for moving 
forward with specific jurisdiction doctrine for products liability cases. 
Brennan’s doctrine is a favorable one from a jurisdictional expansionist 
point of view—a perspective that I whole-heartedly endorse. Of further 
importance, however, Brennan’s method is more analytically sound when 
accounting for the relatedness problem in personal jurisdiction. The 
stream of commerce doctrine treats the relationship between the 
defendant and the forum and the relationship between the lawsuit and 
the forum as analytically distinct categories. 
This, ultimately, should be the purpose of dividing the “fairness” 
analysis from the “minimum contacts” analysis as Brennan did in Asahi. 
Ginsburg’s opinion achieves exactly this result. She does conclude that J. 
 
174 See Dejana v. Marine Tech. Inc., No. 10–CV–4029(JS)(WDW), 2011 WL 
4530012, at *4–5 (E.D.N.Y Sept. 26, 2011) (interpreting Nicastro to mean that the mere 
foreseeability under this fact pattern precluded personal jurisdiction in New York over 
a Missouri boat manufacturer for an accident that happened in a New York boat race). 
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McIntyre has minimum contacts with the state of New Jersey because they 
have placed items in the stream of commerce that foreseeably could 
reach and injure someone in the forum state.175 But, more importantly, 
the analysis goes on to emphasize that the strong connection of the 
lawsuit to New Jersey, and importance of the lawsuit both to the state and 
the plaintiff are factors that strongly favor the exercise of jurisdiction.176 
An advantage of the Brennan rule, then, is to avoid asking the 
generalized relatedness question that has bedeviled courts.177 Specific 
jurisdiction, if taken seriously, should impose on judges a duty to ask 
sharp and targeted questions about the relationship of the lawsuit to the 
forum, instead of theorizing generally about the nature of the 
defendant’s overall relationship with the forum state. In this way, 
meaningful engagement with the concept of specific jurisdiction might 
lead the Court out of decision paralysis. 
The two-step analysis, however, must be meaningful. In commenting 
on Nicastro and Goodyear, Professor Freer has observed that Brennan’s 
approach places “an inordinately high burden on the defendant to 
overcome” a presumption of fairness.178 Therefore, “the only realistic 
option for a court wishing to reject personal jurisdiction is to find that 
the defendant has not forged relevant contacts with the forum.”179 With 
this caveat in mind, reinvigorating the fairness analysis will be most 
effective when the fairness analysis is tied to the purpose and exercise of 
specific jurisdiction in specific cases. Once it is given a precise 
jurisdictional purpose, the fairness analysis can be directed in service of 
specific jurisdiction analysis, rather than as an afterthought or a catchall 
that effectively forces courts to “strain to conclude” that there is an 
absence of minimum contacts.180 
CONCLUSION 
The stream of commerce story in personal jurisdiction is far from 
over. Although one can hope that the Supreme Court will resolve the 
debate in the near future, the next round of the debate will come from 
the federal district and state trial courts that must confront these issues 
on a day-to-day basis. The Supreme Court has not given the lower courts 
much meaningful guidance on how the stream of commerce question 
should be answered. However, the lower courts might do well to show the 
Supreme Court the ways in which this question is answerable at all.  
 
175 See Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
176 Id. at 2797–98. 
177 A significant problem with the Brennan approach is that it might have put too 
much pressure on the fairness aspect of the analysis without simultaneously demanding 
that the fairness inquiry be taken seriously in many cases. See Freer, supra note 14, at 2–3. 
178 Id. at 2. 
179 Id. at 3. 
180 Id. 
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Trial courts, as the shapers and caretakers of the factual record, have 
an opportunity to return specificity to specific jurisdiction analysis, by 
emphasizing specific jurisdiction as a conclusion to be reached rather 
than a starting point for unfocused factual analysis. Lower courts can 
indicate to the Supreme Court that there are smaller and more salient 
questions of relatedness that can and should be answered, questions that 
pertain both to the relationship of the defendant to the forum and the 
relationship of the lawsuit to the defendant and the forum. Perhaps, in 
this way, the Supreme Court can confront a specific jurisdiction that does 
not appear to be so general, and from there begin to emerge from 
decision paralysis. 
